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为什么P2P借贷不会造成资金损失
为什么P2P借贷不会造成资金损失
Peer-to-Peer Lending: Why You Won’t Lose Money
译者：孙丽荟 原文来源：
birchmereadvisors
原作：Birchmere Advisors
注：这是一系列关于我对P2P（或“直接”）贷款在更广投资领域内角色定位的想法的文章中的第三篇。
在过去的几周内，我们一直在讨论投资组合中P2P借贷的角色。讨论从直接持有债务至到期的优点开始；然后我们重点关注了保持资本的本质。接下来，我们会通过分析这种资产类型使负面影响最小化的原因进一步讨论保护资本这一主题。是哪些潜在因素使得点对点借贷看起来风险大、确实很奇怪，实际上却是相对安全的投资？
根本上，这是关于两个基本主要变量（总利率和贷款拖欠率）之间的差的问题。两者的差就是"净收益"。当然，还有很多其他决定最低净收益的因素。点对点平台（如贷款俱乐部、Prosper等）收取的服务费会减少收益。相对于统一的绝对贷款拖欠率，拖欠时间既可对收益产生消极影响，也可产生积极影响。借款人预付费、闲置资金和资产管理费也是会使收益低于利率与坏账率差额的因素。虽然想要尽量简单地解释这种资产类型的特点与资本保护为何类似，我们还是先重点关注这两个简单变量之间的增量。
通过不同来源的数据（美联储、美国劳工统计局、、等等），我们大体上能够得出一个直接结论。在过去的25年中，消费者在无担保的循环信贷上支付的平均总利率为13%-19%。这些利率有升有降，而且在更广泛的利率环境中这些变动是有一定相互联系的。尽管无论何时利率都没有低于过十，P2P放款方事实上仍能够设计出反映13%-19%范围的多样化贷款组合。
相反地，一项由银行和其他金融机构进行的对信用卡坏账率的高级别分析显示贷款拖欠率甚至很少接近十--即使是在最差的消费者经济周期当中。在过去的25年中，根据报道平均坏账率大约为4.5%。追溯到1991年初，在90个财政季度中只有16个的贷款拖欠率超过了6%。根据报道单季最高的坏账率在2010年第二季度达到10.97%，当时失业率也达到历史最高（2010年全年都在9%-10%之间）。当时，信用卡利率大约为14%--表明净收益率仍然接近3%，而且是在过去25年内最差的消费者信用周期中。这两个变量的净差从来没有出现过坏账率超过利率的情况，而且在正常情况下，这一净差将一直在6%-12%的范围内。
无论环境好坏这两个变量的差额都是正的，这一事实让人印象深刻。这预示着机会。需要说明的是，信用卡利率和银行信用卡应收账款坏账率与点对点借贷利率或在线借贷组合坏账率不完全相似。回避风险的传统机构通常会以低价格放款来限制损失；另一方面，P2P放款方则有可能处于借款人风险曲线的任何位置--如果愿意，投资者能够反映银行的历史行为，并以较低的评估账面价值消减、更低的利率将资金借给高信誉的借款对象。相反，P2P放款方能设计出比典型的信用卡应收账款收益率更高的投资组合。很明显，必须承认这一对比不具有可比性，但这些数据相对来说能够尝试解释在不同情况下都能保持正收益的这种引人注目的特质。（贷款俱乐部和Prosper已经公布了历史贷款表现数据，所以通过复盘不同的策略我们能够得出结论：所引数据来源和实际P2P贷款表现之间存在密切关系。）
我相信这样的机会可能会随着时间慢慢减少，P2P借贷实际上是通往这一道路的一个步骤。然而，在规模如此巨大的市场中--符合要求的资金大约有一万亿美元--在直接在线放款方占有市场最大份额并且进一步降低收益之前还需要一段时间。最终，错误定价的风险、错误估计的超高贷款违约率和高利率消费借款者的骂名将开始消退，投资者以最小的风险获得巨大收益的机会将更难寻找。但是，与此同时，我们这样了解这些基本原理的人，知道历史贷款违约率出人意料地低而能够保持平和心态，进而拥有获得高收益的独特机会。你可以对P2P借贷的风险做出任何假设，但是这种持续不断的--照例只有传统机构才能拥有的正净收益--为每个人提供了一种保本机制的考量。
Note: This is the third in a series of posts where I’m offering my thoughts as to the role of peer-to-peer (or “direct”) lending within the broader context of the investment landscape.
Over the past few weeks, we’ve been discussing the role of peer-to-peer lending in an investment portfolio. The conversation started around the advantages of directly hold then we focused on the essentiality of capital preservation. Next, we’ll drill down a bit further into the theme of protecting principal by analyzing the reasons for how this asset class minimizes downside. What are the underlying factors that make peer-to-peer lending – something seemingly risky and definitely “quirky” – a comparatively safe investment?
Fundamentally, it’s an issue of the spread between two basic, primary variables: a) gross interest rates and b) default rates. The spread between them is “net yield.” Sure, there are lots of other factors that come into play in determining a net bottom-line return. Servicing fees charged by the platform (Lending Club, Prosper, etc.) will reduce yield. Timing of defaults – as opposed to a flat absolute default rate – can either negatively or positively effect returns. Borrower pre-payments, idle cash, and asset manager fees are other factors that can repress returns below the fundamental spread between interest rates and charge-offs. In the spirit of keeping it simple, though – and to illustrate the point of how the characteristics of this asset class are akin to capital preservation – let’s focus on the delta between these two simple parameters.
Data from a variety of sources (US Federal Reserve, US Bureau of Labor Statistics, , , among a host of others…) generally lead us to coalesce around one straightforward conclusion.Over the past 25 years, average gross interest rates that consumers pay on unsecured revolving credit lines range from 13% to 19%. There are ebbs and flows in these rates, and there is some correlation to shifts in broader interest rate climates. Regardless, at no point do they fall below the teens, and it’s very realistic that peer-to-peer lenders can construct a diversified loan portfolio of notes that mirror that 13% – 19% range.
Conversely, a high level analysis of historical credit card charge-off rates by banks and other financial institutions shows that default rates seldom even remotely approach the teens – even in the worst of consumer economic cycles. Over the past 25 years, average reported charge-off rates are roughly 4.5%. Dating back to the beginning of 1991, default rates exceeded 6% in only 16 of 90 fiscal quarters. The highest reported charge-off in a single quarter was 10.97% in Q2 of 2010 – a time when unemployment rates were also historically high (between 9-10% throughout 2010).
At that time, credit card interest rates were approximately 14% – indicating a still positive net yield of approximately 3%, in what was by far the worst consumer credit cycle in the past quarter century. The net relationship between these two variables has never been such that charge-off rates exceed interest rates, and, in a normalized environment, will range anywhere from 6% to 12%.
The fact that the spread between the two is positive in both good times and bad is remarkable. It signals opportunity. To be clear, credit card interest rates and charge-offs of bank credit card receivables are not entirely analogous to peer-to-peer lending interest rates or charge-offs in online lending portfolios. Risk averse brick-and-mortar institutions will typically lend at a lower price point in exchange on the other hand, peer-to-peer lenders can play anywhere on the borrower risk curve – an investor can, if he so chooses, mirror what banks have historically done and lend to a subset of higher quality borrowers at lower interest rates with lower estimated write-offs. A peer-to-peer lender can alternatively construct a portfolio at a yield point much higher than would be typical of a book of credit card receivables. The comparison is admittedly not apples-to-apples for obvious reasons, but the data are a relevant starting point to illustrate the compelling characteristic of persistently positive absolute yields in various climates. (Lending Club and Prosper have published historical loan performance data, so by back-testing various strategies we are able to conclude that there is a strong relationship between the referenced data sources and actually peer-to-peer loan performance.)
My belief is that this opportunity may contract over time, and peer-to-peer lending is actually a step in that direction. In a market this big, however – with roughly a trillion eligible dollars – it’s going to take a while before direct online lenders become the lion’s share of the market and push yields down further. Eventually the mis-priced risk, the faulty assumptions of consistently astronomical default rates, and the stigma of high-interest consumer borrowers will start to fade, and the opportunity for investors to obtain such upside with minimal downside will be more difficult to find. In the meantime, though, those of us who understand these fundamentals have a unique opportunity to capture significant yields with the peace of mind that comes from a historical track record of surprisingly low default rates. Say what you will about the presumed risks of peer-to-peer lending, but this consistently positive net yield – access to which was traditionally reserved only for brick-and-mortar institutions – warrants serious consideration for each of us as a mechanism for capital preservation.
From Birchmere Advisors /peer-to-peer-lending-why-you-wont-lose-money/
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