Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation. - Abstract - Europe PMC
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(PMID: PMCID:PMC4743833)
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511; adam.bear@yale.edu david.rand@yale.edu.
David Rand
Yale University
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511; adam.bear@yale.edu david.rand@yale.edu.
[):936-941]
Journal Article, Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
10.1073/pnas.
Humans often cooperate with strangers, despite the costs involved. A long tradition of theoretical modeling has sought ultimate evolutionary explanations for this seemingly altruistic behavior. More recently, an entirely separate body of experimental work has begun to investigate cooperation's proximate cognitive underpinnings using a dual-process framework: Is deliberative self-control necessary to reign in selfish impulses, or does self-interested deliberation restrain an intuitive desire to cooperate? Integrating these ultimate and proximate approaches, we introduce dual-process cognition into a formal game-theoretic model of the evolution of cooperation. Agents play prisoner's dilemma games, some of which are one-shot and others of which involve reciprocity. They can either respond by using a generalized intuition, which is not sensitive to whether the game is one-shot or reciprocal, or pay a (stochastically varying) cost to deliberate and tailor their strategy to the type of game they are facing. We find that, depending on the level of reciprocity and assortment, selection favors one of two strategies: intuitive defectors who never deliberate, or dual-process agents who intuitively cooperate but sometimes use deliberation to defect in one-shot games. Critically, selection never favors agents who use deliberation to override selfish impulses: Deliberation only serves to undermine cooperation with strangers. Thus, by introducing a formal theoretical framework for exploring cooperation through a dual-process lens, we provide a clear answer regarding the role of deliberation in cooperation based on evolutionary modeling, help to organize a growing body of sometimes-conflicting empirical results, and shed light on the nature of human cognition and social decision making.
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, April 2012, Pages
Evolution of brain size in class-based societies of fungus-growing ants (Attini), , , , , a Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute, Balboa, Panamab Biology Department, University of Scranton, PA, U.S.A.A social lifestyle is often assumed to be more complex than a solitary one, due to social demands that may require increased cognitive capabilities. These nested assumptions underlie hypotheses to explain a correlation between brain size and group size in social vertebrates, using group size and accumulation of social traits, as alternative proxies for social complexity. Eusocial insects challenge the generality of the hypothesis that social complexity relies on increased cognitive capabilities of individuals. We used data from previously published studies to test for an association between sociality and brain size across 18 species (nine genera) of fungus-growing ants (Attini), which range from basal taxa with fewer than 100 monomorphic individuals, to derived colonies containing several million polymorphic, highly specialized individuals. Among monomorphic species, increased colony size was associated with decreased relative brain size and increased olfactory lobe size, although the latter result was sensitive to both the exclusion of potential outliers and whether phylogenetically independent contrasts were used. Within leafcutters (Atta), the relative size of the antennal lobes was also associated with group size, but may also reflect ecological foraging specialization, which may be a confounding variable. Comparisons between class- and individual-based societies highlight the general problem of increasing social structure in proportion to group size and show that there are alternative solutions to this problem: one alternative involves increasing behavioural specialization of individua the other involves increased diversification of individual behaviour, social norms and ultimately institutions.Highlights? We examined sociality and brain size in nine genera of fungus-growing ants (Attini). ? Fungus-growing ants showed broad variation in colony size and social organization. ? Brain size varied among taxa in larger colonies and in more tightly knit societies. ? Larger colony size was associated with differential investment in olfactory brain centres. ? Analyses of social complexity using a scalogram yielded results similar to those using group size as a proxy.Keywordsantennal lobe; Attini; Hymenoptera; scalogram; social brain
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