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【CPA行业栏目提醒】：--在 CPA行业编辑为广大网友搜集整理了：注会综合英语课件 - 职业资格绩等信息，祝愿广大网友取得需要的信息，参考。&&&&
坚持到底就是胜利！永不放弃否则太对不起自己！ 注会综合英语 注会综合英语课件 Introduction............................................................................................................................... 1 一、课程简介........................................................................................................................... 1 二、2010 考题与参考答案...................................................................................................... 2 Unit one Ethics.......................................................................................5 Unit two Accounting.............................................................................................................18 Unit three Auditing............................................................................................................... 44 Unit Four Financial and Cost management.......................................................................... 69 Unit Five Corporate strategy and risk management............................................................. 94 Unit Six Economic law.......................................................................................................119Introduction一、课程简介 本的设计主要针对参加综合阶段财经英语测试的考生。&&&&综合阶段财经英语考查的是考生在国际环境下运用英语进行业务处理的能力，主要是书面表达的能力。&&&& 因此，本课程将财经英语基础词汇、相关财经知识及写作技能的培训置于要点解读中，使考生能够在短时间内提高财经英语的写作能力。&&&& 综合阶段考试范围涉及专业阶段的 6 科考试： 、 、 《会计》《审计》《财务成本 、 、 （其中道德操守并在《审管理》《公司战略与风险管理》《经济法》和《税法》计》中），根据综合阶段考试大纲给出的每科考查的主要知识点，准备相应的阅读材料，在对知识要点的梳理和解读中帮助考生掌握专业词汇，提高考生财经英语的阅读能力和运用一些基本词汇，使用正确的语法，撰写的写作能力。&&&& 教学安排： Unit 1 Ethics 职业道德）1.5 hours Unit 2 Accounting 会计2 hours Unit 3 Auditing（审计）1.5 hours 第 1页共 151页 坚持到底就是胜利！永不放弃否则太对不起自己！ Unit 4 Financial and cost management 财务成本管理 2 hours Unit 5 Corporate strategy and risk management 公司战略和风险管理2hours
Unit 6 Economic laws（法）0.5 hour Unit 7 Taxation laws（税法）0.5 hour二、2010 考题与参考答案二、2010 （一）Exam question in 2010 Liang Zheng 梁 正 is the Quality and Risk Management Partner ofBeijing Yangming CPA firm北京阳明.The engagement partner Wang Hong王红has requested Liang Zheng to send her a memo that explains whetherLanzhou Datan CPA firm兰州大潭and Shanghai Yangming CPA firm上海阳明can respectively provide the valuation and internal control servicesto Huimin Energy Company慧敏公司and Xinxing Solar Energy Company新兴 公 司 and how the new Code of Ethics of the Chinese Institute ofCertified Public Accountants impacts on the partner rotation requirementsfor the Zhaolong Energy兆龙能源audit.Suppose you are a CPA in Qualityand Risk Management Department of BeijingYangming CPA firmLiang Zhengrequired you to write a draft of the memo in Englishwhich should coverthe concepts of when a larger structure联合体is a network网络networkfirm网络事务所and key audit partner关键审计合伙人.10 marks 相关资料： 兆龙能源拟以现金收购慧敏公司全部股权，收购价款以兰州大潭会计师事务所以下简称“兰州大潭”进行资产评估的结果为准。&&&& 兆龙能源拟收购新兴太阳能高技术有限公司以下简称“新兴公司”。&&&&新兴公司拟聘请上海阳明会计师事务所以下简称“上海阳明”提供内部控制和咨询服务。&&&& 第 2页共 151页 坚持到底就是胜利！永不放弃否则太对不起自己！ 北京阳明是兆龙能源的审计机构，其合伙人王红一直担任兆龙能源年度财务报表审计的项目合伙人，合伙人苗金担任项目质量控制复核合伙人，另一合伙人赵芝协助王红，但所有重要专业判断均由王红负责。&&&& 在获悉中国注册会计师协会颁布新的中国注册会计师职业道德守则后，王红希望了解关键审计合伙人轮换对兆龙能源年度财务报表审计项目的影响。&&&& 北京阳明为国内排名前十位的会计师事务所之一，与国内一些会计师事务所建立了不同程度的联系和合作，其中有：1与上海阳明共享统一的质量控制政策和程序，并共享同一经营战略；2与兰州大潭共享审计手册和审计方法以及培训资源，但不交流人员、客户信息或市场信息。&&&& 参考答案： According to the new Code of Ethics of the Chinese Institute ofCertified Public Accountants:A structure should be a network if it aimsat sharing the important professional resources among the entitiesthrough the cooperation.And our firm shares the quality policies andproceduresand management strategy with Shanghai Yangming CPA firm.So ourfirm and Shanghai Yangming CPA firm belong to a network. Wanghong andMiaojin are the key audit partners of the network firm.It does not obeythe independence requirement that Shanghai Yangming CPA firm provides theinternal control services. Our firm shares the audit manuals 、 audit methods and trainingresources with Lanzhou Datan CPA firm but they are not the importantprofessional resources.So our firmand Lanzhou Datan CPA firm do not belongto a network.It has no effect on the independence which Lanzhou Datan CPAfirm provides the valuation services to Huimin Energy Company. In terms of the new Code of Ethics of the Chinese Institute ofCertified Public Accountantsif the audit client belongs to publicinterest entitythe key audit partner who provides the auditing service 第 3页共 151页 坚持到底就是胜利！永不放弃否则太对不起自己！cannot hold the position more than five years.The key audit partner cannotbe the same client’s engagement partner or key audit partner in two yearssince he has finished the term. 中文翻译： 根据中国注册会计师协会颁布新的中国注册会计师职业道德守则：如果一个联合体旨在通过合作，在各实体之间共享重要的专业资源，应被视为网络。&&&&而我们事务所与上海阳明共享统一的质量控制政策和，并共享同一经营战略 ，因此我们所与上海阳明事务所属于，王红和苗进属于网络所的关键审计合伙人。&&&&由上海阳明事务所为新兴公司提供内部控制设计和咨询服务违反了独立性要求。&&&& 虽然我们所与兰州大潭共享审计手册和审计方法以及培训资源属于不重要的专业资源，因此我们所与兰州大潭不属于网络，由兰州大潭对惠敏公司进行资产评估对独立性不产生影响。&&&& 根据中国会计师协会颁布新的中国注册会计师职业道德守则，关键审计合伙人如果审计客户属于公众利益实体，执行其审计业务的关键审计合伙人任职时间不得超过五年。&&&&在任期结束后的两年内，该关键审计合伙人不得再次成为该客户的审计项目组成员或关键审计合伙人。&&&& 参考词汇： 1.Comprehensive stage 综合阶段 2.auditing 审计 3.accounting 会计 4.corporate strategy and risk management 公司战略与风险管理 5.financial management and cost management 财务成本管理 6.economic laws 经济法 7.taxtion laws 税法 第 4页共 151页 坚持到底就是胜利！永不放弃否则太对不起自己！ 8.quality and risk management 质量和风险管理 9.the engagement partner 关键合伙人 10.valuation and internal control services 资产评估和内部控制服务 11.the new Code of Ethics of the Chinese Institute of Certified PublicAccountants 中国注册会计师协会新的职业道德规范 12.the partner rotation 合伙人轮换 13.Listed companies 上市公司 14. public interest entity 公众利益实体 （二）Tips 1.Rules principles or theories 2.Definition or explanation 3.Application
in this case 4.Conclusion or suggestionsUnit one Ethics 职业道德 1.中国注册会计师职业道德守则的基本原则和概念框架 2.审计和审阅业务对独立性的要求 一 、 China Code of Ethics for Certified Public AccountantsNo.1――Fundamental Principles of Professional Ethics Integrity 诚信 Independence 独立 第 5页共 151页 坚持到底就是胜利！永不放弃否则太对不起自己！ objectivity 客观和公正 professional competence and due care 专业胜任能力和应有的关注 confidentiality 保密 professional behavior 良好职业行为 一Definition 1. Integrity: members should be straightforward and honest in allprofessional and business relationships.If they see something is asthey should say so they shouldn’t try to conceal it they shouldn’tturn a blind eye they shouldn’t try to be ambiguous they should statethings plainly. 2.Independence can be defined as having freedom from situations andrelationships where objectivity would be perceived to be impaired 损害 by a reasonable and informed third party. A CPA shall keep independence both of mind and in appearance
behaveand be seen to behave and avoid any relationship that influencesobjectivity. 3.Objectivity: members should be influenced by the facts and the factsonly. They must avoid bias（偏见） conflicts of interest（利益冲突）and undue influence（不当的影响）. 4.Professional competence and due care Professional competence and due care: members must keep themselvesup-to-date with legislation and recent developments.They shouldn’t takeon work which they are not qualified for or for which they have noskills.They must be diligentthey must be careful. 第 6页共 151页 坚持到底就是胜利！永不放弃否则太对不起自己！ 5.Confidentiality Confidentiality:members should respect the confidentiality ofinformation acquired as a result of professional and businessrelationships and should not disclose（披露）any such information to thirdparties without proper and specific authority or unless there is a legalor professional right or duty to disclose money laundering. And itshould not be used for the personal advantage of members or third parties. 6.Professional behavior Professional behavior: members should comply with relevant laws andregulations and should avoid any action that discredits（蒙羞，使丢脸）the profession.For example when they are trying to advertise theirservices they shouldn’t say that other members are bad or poor.Theyshould confine themselves to promoting what they are good at theyshouldn’t rubbish other professionals. （二）Test your understanding 1 List and explain the fundamental principles of China Code of Ethicsfor Certified Public Accountants. 二 、 China Code of Ethics for Certified Public AccountantsNo.2――Conceptual Framework Self-interest threat 自身利益的不利影响 Self-review threat 自我评价的不利影响 Advocacy threat 过度推介的不利影响 Familiarity threat 密切关系的不利影响 Intimidation threat 外在压力的不利影响 第 7页共 151页 坚持到底就是胜利！永不放弃否则太对不起自己！ （一）Threats to professional ethics 1.Self-interest threat 1Financial: own shares in the client 2close business relationships 3close family and personal relationships between the auditor and owners or directors of the company they are auditing 4loans and guarantees from the client to the auditor 5overdue fees 6high percentage fees 7contingent fees small fee if qualified larger fee if clean 8employment negotiation 2.Self review threat This occurs when an auditor has to review work that they previouslyperformed. For exampleif the external auditor prepared the financialstatements and then audited them. 3.Advocacy threat This can occur when the auditor is asked to promote or represent theirclient in some way.In this situation the auditor would have to be biasedin favor of the client and therefore cannot be objective.This could happenif the client asked the auditor to promote their shares for a stockexchange listing or if the client asked the auditor to represent them incourt. 4.Familiarity threat 第 8页共 151页 坚持到底就是胜利！永不放弃否则太对不起自己！ This occurs when the auditor is too sympathetic or trusting of theclient because of a close relationship with themso that objectivity andskepticism 怀疑 are lost. This can also arise after a long associationwith a client. 5.Intimidation threat Clients may try to harass or bully auditors into giving preferentialaudit reports. They may use the fee as leverage. 6.The supply of other services The issue of auditor supplying multiple services to theirclientssuch as taxation and management consultancyis a controversialone and there are both pros and cons.For exampleauditors will know a greatdeal about the operations of their clients and this can make theperformance of other work much more efficient.The dangerof courseisthat the auditors come to rely too heavily on the fees earned from theother work and are therefore reluctant to risk losing a client becauseof an adverse audit opinion.Large audit firms can at least use separatedepartment though this may be difficult with small firms. In United States listed companies are not allowed to obtain otherservices from their auditor.This is to ensure that the auditor isindependent and performs only the audit.In most jurisdictions there areno hard and fast rules but the overall guidance on ethics relating toobjectivity and independence should be adhered to. 二、China Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants 第 9页共 151页 坚持到底就是胜利！永不放弃否则太对不起自己！No.2――Conceptual Framework （二）possible safeguards 防范措施 1.General safeguards Safeguards created by the profession. These include: educationtraining and experience requirements for entry into the professioncontinuing professional development requirements corporate governanceregulations professional standards monitoring external review of workand reports and disciplinary（纪律） action. 2.Safeguards in the work environment These include: ethics and conduct programs recruitment proceduresinternal controls disciplinary procedures strong ethical leadershippolicies and procedures to promote quality control and culture. 3.Safeguards created by individuals Complying with professional development requirements keepingrecords of contentious（有异议的） issues using a mentor（导师） andkeeping in contact with professional bodies. 4.Specific safeguards 1Monitoring fees received from significant clients in comparisonto total fees to reduce perception of dependence on clients. 2Rotating（轮换） senior audit staff on an engagement after a fixedperiod to reduce familiarity threat. 3Using separate teams where additional services are offered toaudit clients to reduce self review threat. 4Using independent partners to review work where any ethical threatis identified. 第 10页共 151页 坚持到底就是胜利！永不放弃否则太对不起自己！ 5Not accepting gifts or hospitality unless it is considered by apartner to be modest. 6Not engaging in any business or financial relationship with aclient. 7Not allowing individuals with personal or family ties to a clientto be involved in the audit of that company. 8Not providing accountancy or internal audit services for listedaudit clients. 9Maintaining an up to date engagement letter. 10In cases where no safeguard are considered sufficient the auditorshould resign（辞职）. （三）高频词汇 Client acceptance 接受客户关系 Engagement acceptance 承接业务 Changes in a professional appointment 客户变更委托 Conflicts of interest 利益冲突 Second opinions 第二次意见 Fees 收费 Marketing professional services 专业服务营销 Gifts and hospitality 礼品和招待 Custody of client assets 保管客户资产 Requirements for objectivity 对客观和公正原则的要求 第 11页共 151页 .
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Economics / Finance
Contemporary Accounting Research 2015冬季刊 摘要解析
23 Sep 2016
1. Incentive Contracts, Market Risk, and Cost of Capital激励合约，市场风险和资本成本Jeremy Bertomeu（Baruch）Should incentive contracts expose the agent to market-wide shocks? Counterintuitively, I show that market risk cannot be filtered out from the compensation and managed independently by the agent. Under plausible risk preferences, the principal should offer a contract in which performance pay increases following a favorable market shock. In the aggregate, however, the effect of market risk on individual contracts diversifies away and the agency problem does not directly affect the cost of capital. The analysis suggests caution in interpreting changes in cost of capital in terms of the stewardship role of accounting information.激励合约是否应当使代理人暴露在市场震动里？与直觉相反，本文表明市场风险不能从薪酬中过滤出去，而是被代理人个人所控制。在可解释的风险偏好下，委托人应当提供一个合约，使得绩效工资随着有利的市场震动而增加。在总体水平上，对单个合约的市场风险会被分散掉，因而代理人问题并不会直接影响资本成本。这一分析表明，在运用会计信息的管家作用来解释资本成本变动的时候需要更谨慎一些。2. Mandatory Disclosure, Generation of Decision-Relevant Information, and Market Entry强制披露，决策相关的信息，以及市场进入Georg T. Schneider（Graz） Andreas Scholze（Osnabrück）We investigate the interaction of mandatory disclosure and the gathering of decision-relevant information in a setting in which a competitor may enter the market. Gathering detailed information allows for an efficient allocation of resources, but eventually attracts competition by revealing beneficial information to competitors. In contrast, refraining from generating detailed information implies inefficient decisions, but eventually prevents competitors from entering the market. Our results show that an incentive not to generate internal information arises for two reasons: If the incumbent's cost advantage is sufficiently large, disclosing aggregated information can be an instrument to avoid competition by reducing the likelihood of market entry. If the incumbent's cost advantage is small, disclosing aggregated information attracts competition by increasing the likelihood of market entry. In this case, imprecise cost information serves as a commitment device to reduce the intensity of competition by forcing the competitor to take into account his efficiency disadvantage in making his production decision.本文研究了在一个潜在竞争者可能进入市场的设定下，强制披露和决策相关信息的相互作用。大量详细的信息可以使得资源有效分配，但是最终这些信息透露的优势可能会吸引潜在的竞争者。与之相反，不发布详细的信息意味着低效的决策，但是最终会阻止竞争者进入市场。本文结果表明，两个原因导致了不发布内部信息的动机：（1） 如果现有公司的成本优势足够大的话，披露聚合水平的信息可能会避免引进市场进入者的竞争。（2） 如果现有公司的成本优势较低的话披露聚合水平的信息会提高潜在的市场进入可能性，从而增加竞争。在这种情况下，不准确的成本信息可以促使潜在竞争者在做出生产决策时考虑效率劣势，从而减弱竞争。3. Outside Blockholders' Monitoring of Management and Debt Financing外部大股东对管理层和债券融资的监管Scott Liao(Toronto)Corporate governance mechanisms designed to alleviate manager-shareholder agency conflicts can worsen shareholder-bondholder conflicts. This study examines how one such corporate governance mechanism, monitoring by large outside shareholders, influences the choice between public and private debt. I conjecture and find that firms with higher outside blockholdings are inclined to choose bank loans over public debt when they borrow, consistent with the notion that banks are better monitors than public debt markets. I also find that bank loans carry less price protection than corporate bonds against increased agency risk associated with outside blocks. Corroborating the monitoring story, I document that bank loans contain more accounting-based covenants and dividend restriction provisions for firms with higher outside blockholdings than for those with lower blockholdings. I find no such relation for public debt covenants. This supports that banks' monitoring of their loans counters the agency risk caused by blockholders. This study extends prior research that associates governance mechanisms with agency costs of debt, by incorporating lenders' differential monitoring mechanisms in the overall corporate governance system.公司监管机制是用来削弱经理和股东之间的代理人冲突，然而，它可能会加剧股东和债权人的冲突。本文研究了被外部大股东控制的公司监管如何影响公司对公共债务和私人债务的选择。 本文发现，有更大的外部股东的公司倾向于选择银行贷款而非公共债务，这一发现符合银行比公共债务市场更善于监管这一理论。本文也发现，相比较公司债券而言，银行贷款对于代理人风险的价格保护更少。 本文也表明对于有更高水平的外部大股东的公司，银行贷款包含更多的基于会计的合约和限制股利的条款。 而这一关系没有在公共债务合约上体现。本文的贡献是，在分析债务的代理人成本与监管机制之间的关系时，考虑了借款方对于总体公司监管体系的差异化控制机制。4. External Corporate Governance and Misreporting外部公司监管和误报William R. Baber(Gerogetown), Sok-Hyon Kang(GWU), Lihong Liang(Syracuse) andZinan Zhu(NUS)This study investigates how external corporate governance provisions, specifically statutory and corporate charter provisions that limit direct shareholder participation in the governance process, affect the likelihood of an accounting restatement. The analysis indicates that strong external governance (fewer restrictions on shareholder participation) is associated with a relatively low incidence of accounting restatements. The effect of external governance is incremental to that of internal governance, which is considered as provisions that foster effective board oversight of management. Such evidence supports the premise that shareholder participation improves financial reporting quality.本文研究了公司外部监管规定，尤其是法定的和那些限制股东直接参与监管过程的公司特许规定如何影响会计重述的可能性。本文表明强劲的外部监管（对股东参与较小的限制）与较低的会计重述率相关。外部监管的作用是叠加在内部监管之上的，被认为是促进有效董事会监管的规定。本文支持了股东参与提高财务报告质量这一观点。5. Does the Identity of Engagement Partners Matter? An Analysis of Audit Partner Reporting Decisions负责合伙人的身份重要吗？对审计合伙人轮换的分析W. Robert Knechel(Florida), Ann Vanstraelen(Maastrichit) Mikko Zerni(Jyv?skyl?)This study examines the persistence and economic consequences of variations in reporting style across audit partners in individual engagements. Our results show that both aggressive and conservative audit reporting, measured by the pattern of prior Type 2 and Type 1 audit reporting error rates in auditor-specific clienteles, persist over time and extend to other clients of the same partner. Analyses of abnormal accruals and persistence of client firms’ accrual estimates corroborate this finding, and hold both for private and publicly listed companies. Further, our results also show that the market penalizes client firms susceptible to aggressive audit partner reporting decisions. In particular, we find that our proxies for aggressive audit reporting are related to higher interest rates, worse credit ratings and less favorable forecasts of insolvency for private client companies, and a lower Tobin's Q for publicly listed client companies. Collectively, these results imply that audit partner aggressive or conservative reporting is a systematic audit partner attribute and not randomly distributed across engagements.本文研究了审计合伙人的报告风格的一致性和经济结果。结果表明激进和保守的审计报告风格都具有时间一致性，并且可以衍生到同一合伙人的其他审计任务上。通过分析异常的应计项目和客户公司的应计计量的一致性，验证了这一发现无论在私有或者上市公司上都存在。进一步而言，本文结果还表明市场会惩罚那些可能被激进审计的客户公司。总体而言，结果表明审计合伙人的激进或者保守的合伙风格是系统性的特性，而非取决于单独的审计任务。6. Effect of Concession-Timing Strategies in Auditor–Client Negotiations: It Matters Who Is Using Them让步时间策略在审计师与客户协商中的作用Yan Sun (Lanzhou), Hun-Tong Tan(NTU) andJixun Zhang (Nankai)In this study, we examine how norms about the use of negotiation strategies by different parties in an auditor–client negotiation influence the relative efficacies of these negotiation strategies. We conduct an experiment with experienced auditors/financial managers as participants, who enter into a negotiation on an income-decreasing audit adjustment with a hypothetical client/auditor who uses a strategy where the same concessions are given either at the start, gradually, or the end of the negotiation. We find that the concession-end strategy is more effective than the concession-start strategy w however, the reverse is true when these same strategies are used by financial managers. The concession-gradual strategy leads to superior outcomes when used by either auditors or clients. We also provide evidence that auditors’ and financial managers’ perceptions of the norms relating to the use of these strategies correspond to what we propose in our theory.本文检验了在审计师和客户协商的过程中，各方对协商策略的认知如何影响这些策略的有效性。本文运用实验的方法，使用有经验的审计师和财务经理作为参与者，模拟了一个降低收入的审计调整的协商过程，其中包含了在开始，渐进，或者最后使用让步策略三种情况。本文发现当审计师使用让步时间策略的时候，在快结束时让步更有效。但是，当财务经理使用让步策略的时候，在开始时让步更为有效。渐进让步会对审计师和财务经理都带来更好的结果。7. The Effects of Norms on Investor Reactions to Derivative Use规范对投资者使用衍生品的反应的影响Lisa Koonce(UT Austin), Jeffrey Miller(Notre Dame) andJennifer Winchel(Virginia)Prior research indicates that a firm's use of derivatives to manage business risks is viewed favorably by investors. However, these studies do not consider a potentially key factor in this setting—namely, the typical behavior (or norms) regarding derivatives by other firms in the industry or the firm itself. In this paper, we report the results of multiple experiments that test whether norms are influential in affecting investors’ evaluations of firms’ derivatives choices. Our results show that the generally favorable reactions to derivative use actually reverse and become unfavorable when firms’ derivative decisions are inconsistent with industry or firm norms. Somewhat surprisingly, though, we find that industry and firm norms are not viewed similarly by investors. These results expand our understanding of how investors respond to firm's derivative use decisions and demonstrate the role of norms as factors that influence investors’ judgments in financial reporting settings. Our results have implications for firm managers making decisions about derivative use.过去的研究认为公司通过使用衍生品来控制企业风险这一行为被投资者视为积极的信号。但是，这些研究没有考虑到行业里其他公司或者这个公司本身对于衍生品使用的典型行为（规范）。本文通过多个实验，检测了规范是否影响投资者对公司衍生品选择的评价。结果表明，当公司的衍生品决定于行业或者公司规范不符合时，投资者的评价转为负面。本文也发现，投资者对行业和公司规范的看法并不一致。8. Financial Statement Complexity and Meeting Analysts’ Expectations财务报表的复杂性与达到分析师预期Joshua J. Filzen (Navada) Kyle Peterson(Oregon)We examine whether firms with greater financial statement complexity are more likely to meet or beat analysts’ earnings expectations. We proxy for financial statement complexity using the firm's industry and year adjusted accounting policy disclosure length. Firms with more complex financial statements are more likely to just beat expectations than just miss expectations. Firms with complex financial statements appear to use expectations management to beat expectations, but do not use earnings management. Corroborating these findings, we find analysts rely more on management guidance for more complex firms. Firms with complex financial statements are also more likely to have analysts exclude items from actual “street earnings,” but tests suggest this strategy is not specifically used by complex firms to beat expectations. The effect we document is specific to analyst forecasts and not to other alternative benchmarks.本文检验了财务报表复杂性较高的公司是否更容易达到或者打破分析师预期。本文用经行业和年份调节过的会计政策披露长度来衡量财务报表的复杂性。那些财务报表复杂度更高的公司，更容易刚好打破分析师预期，而非刚好错过分析师预期。财务报表预期更复杂的公司使用预期管理而非盈余管理来打破分析师预期。同时，本文也发现分析师对于复杂的公司，更多的依赖于管理层引导。财报复杂的公司也更容易使得分析师排除本文的结论只适用于分析师预测，而非其他基准。9. Qualitative Disclosure and Changes in Sell-Side Financial Analysts' Information Environment定性披露和卖方财务分析师信息环境的变动Zahn Bozanic(OSU) Maya Thevenot(Florida Atlantic)We examine a routine and timely disclosure, earnings press releases, to determine the extent to which several novel qualitative elements of such disclosures are associated with changes in sell-side financial analysts' information environment. Using a comprehensive set of GARCH-based (generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity) proxies, we examine how disclosure readability's components, across-document textual similarity, and within-document lexical diversity alter analysts' information environment. We find that readability in the form of shorter sentences, textual similarity, and lexical diversity are strongly related to decreases in analysts' uncertainty. Further, shorter sentences and lexical diversity improve both public and private information precision, whereas similarity affects solely analysts' private information precision. While the GARCH-based proxies allow us to alleviate concerns regarding potentially spurious inferences (Sheng and Thevenot 2012), we note as a caveat that such an estimation restricts our inferences to large, stable, and heavily followed firms. These findings should be of interest to analysts who may wish to explore the latent information contained within the qualitative elements of disclosure, regulators who direct the form and content of disclosure, and academics who study the use (and possible misuse) of various forms of information and its presentation.本文研究了一个常规并及时的披露，即收益预期，以及它的定性方面如何影响卖方分析师的信息环境。使用一组GARCH的代理因子，本文检验了披露的可读性，不同文本间的相似性，同一文档间的词汇差异性如何影响分析师的信息环境。本文发现当使用短句带来的易读性，文本相似性和词汇差异性极大的降低了分析师的不确定性。此外，短句和词汇差异性提高了公共和私人信息的准确性，而相似性值提高了分析师的私人信息准确性。10. Understanding Cross-Country Differences in Valuation Ratios: A Variance Decomposition Approach理解价值比率的跨国差异Timothy K. Chue(Polytenic)We use a variance decomposition approach to examine why aggregate valuation ratios differ across countries. In a cross section of 22 developed countries from 1980 to 2009, we find that 50 percent of all cross-country differences in the aggregate price-to-book ratio (P/B) can be explained by cross-country differences in expected future five-year profitability. In the second half of our sample period, this percentage exceeds that of the first half, rising to almost 64 percent. Although international differences in accounting standards and conventions may have made earnings from different countries more difficult to compare relative to dividends, we find that it is still cross-country differences in expected future profitability, rather than dividend growth rates, that are more closely related to international differences in valuation ratios. Even among 25 emerging markets, we find that expected future profitability at the five-year horizon can account for 29 percent of all cross-country P/B variations. Our results show that international investors are able to identify substantial cross-country differences in future-earnings prospects and incorporate them into stock market valuations.本文使用方差分解方法来检验估值比率在不同国家间的差异。通过研究1980年到2009年之间22个发达国家，本文发现市净率一半的跨国差异可以被未来五年利润率的跨国差异所解释。在样本的后半段时间里，这一比例到达了64%。尽管会计准则的国际差异使得相比较于股利而言，不同国家的收入更难对比，本文发现 预期未来利润率比股利增长率更能解释跨国间估值比率的不同。即使在25个新兴市场，本文也发现未来五年的预期利润率可以解释29%的跨国市净率差异。本文结论表明投资者可以辨别重要的未来收入预期的跨国差异，并且在股票市场估值上反应出来。11. The Value of Political Ties Versus Market Credibility: Evidence from Corporate Scandals in China政治联系的价值与市场可行度：来自中国的公司丑闻的证据Mingyi Hung(HKUST), T. J. Wong(CUHK) Fang Zhang(HK Baptist)This paper compares the value of political ties and market credibility in China by examining the consequence of corporate scandals. We categorize Chinese corporate scandals by whether the scandal is primarily associated with the destruction of (i) the firm's political networks (political scandals), (ii) the firm's market credibility (market scandals), or (iii) both (mixed scandals). Consistent with our hypothesis that scandals signaling the destruction of political ties are associated with greater losses in firm value than scandals signaling the destruction of market credibility, we find that the stock market reacts more negatively to political and mixed scandals than to market scandals. In addition, the greater negative market reactions associated with political and mixed scandals are primarily driven by firms that rely more on political networks. We also find that, compared to market scandals, political and mixed scandals lead to larger decreases in operating performance, greater reduction in loans from state-owned banks, and higher departure of political directors.本文通过检验公司丑闻的后果，比较了在中国政治联系的价值和市场可信度。本文将中国公司丑闻分为三类（1）政治丑闻（2）市场丑闻（3）两者兼有（复合丑闻）。本文发现，与失去政治联系相关的政治丑闻，比与失去市场可信度相关的市场丑闻更能摧毁公司的价值。此外，这一负面市场反应在那些更依赖于政治联系的公司里表现更为明显。本文也发现，与市场丑闻相比，政治丑闻和复合丑闻会导致更大幅度的经营业绩下降，更大的国有银行贷款下降，以及更多的政治有关的董事的离开。12. Accounting and Preserving the American Way of Life会计与保持美国的生活方式Stephen P. Walker (Edinburg)Responding to calls to instate the visual in accounting history research, this study utilizes photographic images to reveal the role of accounting in the attempt to preserve an ideal (ruralism) and an institution (the family farm) in the United States. These elemental features of the American way of life were threatened during the interwar depression, resulting in governmental programs to secure their restoration. The analysis of official imagery reveals how the accounting prescriptions attending state intervention in agriculture were deemed conducive to the fortification of the economic, social and political foundations of agrarian living. Documentary photographs propagated the notion that accounting facilitated companionate marriage and the inclusive family. They also suggested that accounting was a focus for encouraging the communitarian endeavor, democratic participation and receptivity to state interventionism considered necessary to preserve the rural mode of living.本文使用了照片资料反映了会计在保存美国的田园生活和家庭农场里的作用。这些美式生活方式被战争间的萧条大幅影响，因此政府推出了一些措施来重建它们。通过分析官方的图像，本文反映了在政府介入农业的过程中，会计是如何加强农耕生活中的经济，社会和政治基础。这些资料照片传播了这一信息：会计帮助了和谐婚姻和包容家庭。也表明会计集中在鼓励沟通，民主参与和接受联邦介入这些必要的保存乡村生活模式的行为。
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